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November 22, 1978 Conference _ ~ ~fs-
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No. 78-488 Cert to C~ 1; ~~~ 
(VanDusen, Rosen, Stern(dj)) 
UNITED STATES 
v. 
564.54 ACRES OF LAND Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: The government seek-s to reverse a ruling 
that private, non-profit organizations upon condemnation of 
their property can receive substitution costs instead of fair 
market value if the organization's property serves a "public 
benefit". 
FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: The government initiated 
condemnation proceedings in 1970 against property owned by the 
EJ , ·sUA.~~ - 3:. ~~ cro...i. ~J 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Synod of the Lutheran Church of 
America and used as a summer camp for young people. The camp 
was operated on a non-profit basis, and one of its several 
functions was to permit inner-city children to spend some time 
in the country. The Synod, anticipating the proceedings, 
earlier had purchased a replacement site in the Poconos. The 
Synod offered to prove that the cost of developing new camps on 
the replacement site would be $ 5.8 million. The government 
contended fair market value did not exceed $ 485,000. A large 
part of this discrepancy apparently is due to environmental and 
other regulations which, because of grandfathering, do not 
apply to the existing facility but would to a new camp. The 
district court ruled that the Synod would be entitled only to 
the fair market value of the property, not the cost of 
obtaining a substitute facility. On an interlocutory appeal 
under 28 u.s.c. § 1292(b), the Third Circuit reversed. United 
States v. 564.54 Acres, 506 F.2d 796 (3d Cir. 1974) (Hastie, 
Gibbons, Weis). Although fair market value was the standard 
measure of damages in a condemnation proceeding, courts 
traditionally had applied substitution costs as an alternative 
measure when the condemnee was a government entity under a 
legal obligation to replace the facility condemned. More 
recent decisions also had allowed substitution costs even where 
the government entity was not obligated legally to provide the 
services, as long as the public benefits derived from the 
property were "necessary" to the community. The court saw no 
reason to distinguish private, non-profit entities from 
2. 
3. 
governmental bodies, as both could provide public benefits. 
Accordingly, the Synod would be entitled to receive 
substitution costs if it could prove that the property 
condemned provided a community benefit. 
The question whether the property provided a community 
benefit, thus entitling the Synod to substitution costs, was 
put to the jury, which answered an interrogatory to that effect 
in the negative. The jury also returned a verdict for the 
Synod of $ 740,000. 
On appeal, a divided panel of the Third Circuit 
reversed. In arguing to the jury that the camp was not a non-
profit facility, the government argued that, in light of the 
various religious facilities which the camp contained, the 
Synod was realizing a "religious profit" which rendered it 
ineligible to receive the higher valuation. Further, the jury 
was instructed that the camp could be regarded as "reasonably 
necessary" to a community benefit, and therefore eligible for 
the higher valuation, only if it fulfilled a community need 
that otherwise would go unmet. The government's argument was 
error, as pecuniary profit was the only criterion for non-
profit status. The instruction· was too restrictive, as 
property should qualify for the higher valuation if it provided 
any community benefit, even if not "necessary" in the sense of 
•indispensible". District Judge Stern concurred. He believed 
the earlier interlocutory decision was wrong and objectionable, 
but as he lacked the power to vote for a rehearing he felt 
constrained to follow the prior decision. Judge Rosenn 
4. 
dissented, arguing that the government's improper remarks · were 
cured by corrective instructions and that the instructions on 
community benefit were not erroneous. 
CONTENTIONS: The government contends the application 
of the substitution costs standard to non-governmental entities 
by the court below is unprecedented and erroneous. The 
standard entails a substantial subsidy and windfall profits, 
inasmuch as depreciation of the condemned property is not 
deducted from the award. Hence the condemnee is able to 
replace depreciated facilities with new ones at public expense. 
This standard makes sense when · the facilities are unique and 
nonmarketable, such as streets, highways, and bridges, and 
where the condemnee lies under an obligation, either legal or 
practical, to replace the facilities condemned. But private 
entities, unlike governmental bodies, are not so obliged and 
should not receive such a subsidy. Further, it is wrong to 
permit such a substantial difference in valuation to hinge on a 
jury determination of public benefit. Such an open-ended 
inquiry invites discrimination and unfairness. The inquiry is 
especially objectionable in cases such as this one, where the 
condemnee is a religious organization and its facility had a 
religious purpose. Inviting a jury to decide which religious 
functions provide a public benefit presents serious First 
Amendment problems. 
The Synod argues that the indemnification principles 
applied here are well-settled and that the decision below does 
not represent a departure from prior law. There are no First 
Amendment overtones, as the secular purpose of the facility, 
and n6t its religious sponsorship, is the only question for the 
jury. Finally, the decision below is interlocutory, and the 
government still might win after a new trial. 
DISCUSSION: Contrary to respondent's assertions, the 
decision below constitutes a substantial extension of the 
substitute cost valuation method and lacks any precedent. 
Neither the court below nor respondent have cited a single case 
where a private party was allowed to benefit from the 
substitution costs standard. The first Third Circuit decision 
did cite Brown v. United States, i63 U.S. 78 (1923), as 
authority for the application of the substitution costs 
standard to non-governmental entities. Brown involved a 
challenge to the government's authority to condemn land needed 
to relocate a town which had been uprooted by the construction 
of a reservoir. The Court held that the condemnation power 
properly extended to the obtaining of property needed to 
substitute for private property condemned for a public purpose. 
There was no valuation issue in that case at all. 
As the government points out, substitution cost is a 
fair measure of damages where, for one reason or another, the 
condemnee must replace the facilities. Among other things, the 
standard recognizes that an entity which must obtain new 
property at any cost does not have the same bargaining power as 
one which can wait until the price is right. In such 
situations, the standard simply provides an alternative means 






distortions prevent the realization of fair market value. The 
decision below turned this rationale on its head and regarded 
substitution costs as a subsidy to be given to "good works", 
rather than as an evaluation method. Further, the standard 
applied is both unfair and potentially discriminatory. It is 
unfair because not only non-profit organizations provide 
benefits to the community. As Judge Stern's opinion points 
out, a factory that provides employment also renders a 
substantial community benefit. The standard is potentially 
-
discriminatory because it is so amorphous, and invites juries 
to favor functions they 1 ike. - Contrary to respondent's 
contentions, relgious purposes will be a factor in this 
evaluation. 
Finally, if review is granted now and the decision of 
- the court below is reverse~ the jury verdict can be reinstated 
A 
and there will be no need for a new trial. In this sense, the 
case is not interlocutory and is ripe for review. 
There is a response. 
11/8/78 Stephan opns in petn 
6. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATm 
· ~ 
On Writ of Certiorltl'i ~ ) 
No. 78--488 
United States, Petitioner, 
v. 
564.54 Acres of Land, More or Less, 
situated in Monroe and Pike 
Counties, Pennsylvania, 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for ( Jt1.1 ~~ 
the Third Circuit. v f........- -
et al. 
[May -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
At issue in this case is the proper measure of compensation 
when the Government condemns property owned by a private 
nonprofit organization and operated for a public purpose. In 
particula.r, we must decide whether the Just Compensation 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment 1 requires payment of replace-
ment cost rather than fair market vall.le of the property taken. 
I 
Respondent, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Synod of the 
Lutheran Church in America, operates three nonprofit sum-
mer camps along the Delaware River: In June 1970, the 
United States initiated a condemnation proceeding to acquire 
respondent's land for- a public recreational project. Before 
trial, the Government offered to pay respondent $485,400 as 
the fair market value of its property. Respondent rejected the 
offer· and demanded approxi:ina.tely $5.8 million, the asserted 
cost of developing functionally equiva,Jent substitute facilities 
1 The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides in pertinent part: 





2 UNITED STATES v. 564.54 ACRES OF LAND 
at a new site. This substantial award was necessary, respond-
ent contended, because the new facilities would be subject to 
financially burdensome regulations from which existing facili-
ties were exempt tJnder grandfather provisions. 
In a pretrial ruling, the District Court held that the "sub-
stitute facilities," or replacement cost, measure of compensa-
tion was available only to governmental condemnees, and 
that respondent therefore was entitled only to the fair market 
value of its property. App. 38-48. On interlocutory appeal, 
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 506 F. 
2d 796 ( 197 4). Relying on other circuit court decisions, 2 the 
Court of Appeals determined that in condemnations of prop-
erty belonging to States or their subdivisions, the Fifth 
Amendment requires an award of replacement cost "so tha.t 
the functions carried out by or on behalf of members of the 
community may be continued." Id., at 799-800.3 Since the 
Fifth Amendment refers expressly to private but not to public 
property, the court reasoned that the Framers could not have 
('intended to impose a greater obligation of indemnification" 
toward public entities than toward private owners. Id., at 
801. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals applied standards 
governing condemnations of publicly owned property, and 
held that substitute facilities compensation was available to 
2 Sec, e. g., United States v. Certain Property, 403 F. 2d 800 (CA2 
1968); United States v. Board of Education of Mineral County, 253 F. 
2d 670 (CA4 1958); State of Washington v. United States, 214 F . 2d 33 
(CA9), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 862 (1954); City of Fort Worth v. Unitea 
States, 188 F. 2d 217· (CA5 1951) . 
3 This Court has not passed on the propriety of substitute facilities com-
pensation for public condemners. Although the Court oJ Appeals cited 
Brown v. United States, 263 U. S. 78 (1923), as "the genesis of the sub-
stitution of facilities method of mrasuring fair compensation," 576 F. 2d 
796, 802 (CA3 1977), that case addressed the scope of the Government's 
condemnation power, not the compensation rrquisite under the Fifth 
Amendment. In light of our di~position of this rasr, wr rxprrss no-
opinion on the appropriate measure of compensation for publicly owned 
property. 
77 -488-0PINION 
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private nonprofit owners if there was no "ready market" for 
the condemned property and if the facilities were "reasom~bly 
necessary to public welfare." ld., at 800. The case was re-
manded to the District Court for consideration of whether 
respondent's property met this test. 
After a 10-day trial, the District Court instructed the jury 
regarding the prerequisites for a substitute facilities award. 
In particular, the court charged that there was no "ready 
market" for respondent's facilities if "the fair market value 
of the condemned property [was] substantially less than the 
cost of constructing functionally equivalent substitute facili-
ties." See 576 F. 2d 983. 992 n. 9 (CA3 1977). The District 
Court further instructed that the property was "reasonably 
necessary to public welfare~' if it "fulfill [ ed] a community 
need or purpose." See id., at 995 n. 16. The jury found 
that respondent was not entitled to substitute facilities com-
pensation, and after considering additional evidence, awarded 
$740,000 as the fair market value of the property. 
A different panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. !d., at 
996. Although the court found that the jury instructions on 
the ready-market issue were not fundamentally in error,4 it 
disagreed with the District Court's interpretation of the 
reasonable necessity requirement. Under the Court of 
Appeals' theory, this test was met if the facility "provide[d] 
a benefit to the community that [would] not be as fully pro~ 
vided after the facility [was] taken." !d., at 995. Because 
the jury instruction had been framed in terms of necessity 
rather than community benefit, the court concluded that a 
4 The Court of Appeals, however, did seek to clarify the ready-market 
criterion, holding that 
"regardless of whether tlw Synod rould have sold the ramps, and regard-
lf:'ss of whethf:'r the camps had fair market value, this condition ... is met 
if the Synod could not havf' rPplacf'd thf' camps' facilitie~ in the market 
place for a cost roughly equivalent to the fair market value of the ramps." 
'576 F. 2d 983, 991 (CA3 1977) . 
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new trial was required. One judge, concurring, agreed that 
the trial court's charge had not been consistent with the Court 
of Appeals' interlocutory decision, but argued that the prior 
opinion, although controlling, was incorrect. !d., at 996-1000. 
The third member of the panel dissentea on the ground that 
the District Court had adhered to the principles previously 
enunciated in the interlocutory opinion. 1d., at 1001-1010. 




In giving content to the just compensation requirement of 
the Fifth Amendment. this Court has sought to put the owner 
of condemned property "in as good a position pecuniarily as 
if his property had not been taken." Olson v. United States, 
292 U. S. 246, 255 (1934).5 However, this principle of in-
demnity has not been given its full and literal force. Because 
of serious practical difficulties in assessing the worth au in-
dividual places on particular property at a given time, we 
have recognized the need for a relatively objective working 
rule. See United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 374 ( 1943); 
United States v. Cars, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949). The Court 
therefore has employed the concept of fair market value to 
determine the condemnee's loss. Under this standard, the 
owner is entitled to receive "what a willing buyer would 
pay in cash to a willing seller" at the time of the taking. 
United States v. Miller, supra, at 374; accord, City of New 
York v. Sage, 239 U. S. 55, 61 (1915); United States v. Virgina 
5 Accord, Monogahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 
326 (1892); United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, :373 (1943); United 
States v. Vi1·ginia Electric Power Co., 365 U. S. 624, 633 (1961); United 
States v. Reynolds, 397 U. S. 14, 16 ( 1970); Almota Farmers Elevator ana 
Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U, S, 470, 473-474 (1973). 
77-488-0PINION 
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Electric Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961); Almota Farmers 
Elevator and Warehouse Co., 409 U.S. 470, 474 (1973). 
Although the market value standard is a useful and gen-
erally sufficient tool for ascertaining the compensa.tion re-
quired to make the owner whole,6 the Court has acknowledged 
that such an award does not necessarily compensate for all 
values an owner may derive from his property. Thus, we 
have held that fair market value does not include the special 
value of property to the owner arising from its adaptability 
to his particular use. United States v. Miller, supra, at 374-
375; United States v. Cors, supra, at 332. As Justice Frank-
furter explained in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 
u.s. 1, 5 (1949) : 
"The value of property springs from subjective needs and 
attitudes; Its value to the owner may therefore differ 
widely from its value to the taker. Most things, how~ 
ever, have a general demand which gives them a value 
transferable from one owner to another. As opposed to 
such personal and variant standards as value to the par-
ticular owner whose property has been taken, this trans-
ferable value has an external validity which makes it a 
fair measure of public obligation to compensate the loss 
incurred by an owner as a result of the taking of his prop-
erty for public use. In view, however, of the liability of 
all property to condemnation for the common good, loss 
to the owner of nontransferable values deriving from his 
unique need for property or idiosyncratic attachment 
to it, like loss due to an exercise of the police power, is 
properly treated as part of the burden of common 
citizenship." 
6 ThP ~tandard i~ mo;;1 arrurate with rpspect to readily salablP articlPs, 
for rxample, merchandi:se, bPcau;;e thr valur of such propPrty i:s ordinarily 
what it can command in tlw markPtplace. SPe United States v. Toronto, 
Hamilton & Buffa,lo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 404 (1949) . 
77 -488-0PINION 
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See 1 L. Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain § 14 (2d ed. 
1953). In short, the concept of fair market value has been 
chosen to strike a fair "balance between the public's need and 
the claimant's loss" upon condemnation of property for a pub-
lic purpose. Un·ited States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo 
Navigation Co., 338 U. S. 396, 402 (1949); see also United 
States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266. 280 (1943). 
But while the indemnity principle must yield to some extent 
before the need for a practical general rule, this Court has 
refused to designate market value as the sole measure of just 
compensation. For there are situations where this standard 
is inappropriate. As we held in Um'ted States v. Commodities 
Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950) : 
" [W] hen market value has been too difficult to find or 
when its application would result in manifest injustice to 
the owner or public, courts have fashioned and applied 
other standards. . . . Whatever the circumstances under 
which such constitutional questions arise. the dominant 
consideration always remains the same: What compensa-
tion is 'just' both to an owner whose property is taken 
and to the public that must pay the bill?" (Footnote 
omitted.) 
See also United States v. Cars, supra, at 332; United States v. 
Toronto, Hamilton, & Buffalo Navigation Co., supra, at 402; 
United States v. Miller, supra, at 374.7 Hence. we must deter-
mine whether application of the fair market value standard 
here would be impracticable or whether an award of market 
value would diverge so substantially from the indemnity prin-
ciple as to violate the Fifth Amendment. 
1 To be sure , the is,;ne in the~e easeR was whether the asserted market 
value exceeded the compensation necessary to indemnify the condemnees. 
But " the principle, as ~tated in the Commodities 'l'rading opinion, must 
work both ways." i\Iatte1' of Valuation Proceedings, 445 F . Supp. 994, 
1Da1 (Sp. Cf R . R. R . A. 1977) (Friendly, J .) . 
77-488-0PINJON 
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B 
The instances in which market value is too difficult to as~ 
certain generally involve prop~rty of a type so infrequel1tly 
traded that we cannot predict whether the prices previously 
paid, assuming there have been prior sales, would be repeated 
in a sale of the condemned property. See United States v. 
Toronto, Hamilton, & Buffalo Navigation Co., supra, at 402; 
cf. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S., at 374-375. This might 
be the case, for example, with respect to public facilities such 
a:s roads or sewers. But respondent's property does not fall 
in this category.8 There was a market for camps, albeit not 
an extremely active one. The Government's expert witness 
presented evidence concerning 11 recent sales of comparable 
facilities in the vicinity, and estimated that respondent's 
camps could have been sold within six months to a year after 
they were offered for sale. Tr. 256-258, 263-264, 269-276. 
Indeed. respondent's own expert testified that he had prepared 
an appraisal of the camps' fair market value on the date of 
the taking. App. 143-144. And the Court of Appeals im-
plicitly acknowledged that the market value of nonprofit prop-
erty is ordinarily ascertainable since application of the court's 
r'ready market" criterion requires assessment of fair market 
value. See n. 4, supra. Thus, it seems clear that respond-
ent's property had a readily discernible market value. The-
only remaining inquiry is whether such an award would im-
permissibly deviate from the indemnity principle. 
8 The jury's determination that the camps had a market value of 
$740,000 does not r0solve the issue whether market vn,lue was in fact 
aRcertainable. That issue depends on whether evidence could feasibly be 
obtained to presrnt a jury question on the appropriate market value. 
Such an inquiry is related to the one an appellate court would undertake 
in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's market 
value determination . However, in the latter circumstance, the issue would 
be whether evidence waH in fact presented from which the jury could' 
1:ati:onally art:lve at ils result. 
ec,I'Vt ferrf'o. 7 ,·""'I 
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Emphasizing that the primary value of the condemned 
property lies in the use to which it is put, respondent argues 
that mat!ret O'&>Wp!!~~ would be unjust in the present 
con ext. Because new facilities would bear financial burdens 
imposed by regulations to which the existing camps were not 
subject, an award of market value would preclude continua-
tion of respondent's use. Brief for Respondent 5. Respond-
ent therefore concludes that such a recovery would be insuffi-
cient to indemnify for its loss. See 506 F. 2d, at 798. 
However, it is not at all unusual that property uniquely 
adapted to the owner's use has a market value on condemna-
tion which falls far short of enabling the owner to preserve 
that use. Such a situation may often arise, for example, 
where a family home has been built to the owner's tastes, but 
is old and deteriorated, or where a structure, like respondent's 
camps, is exempt from regu1ations applicable to new facilities. 
Cf. 1 L. Orgel. ~ 14, at 172. Yet the Court has previously 
determined that nontransferable values arising from the 
owner's unique need for the property are not compensable, 
and has found that this divergence from full indemnification ~ 
does not violate the Fifth Amendment. See supra, at ~
We are unable to discern why a different result should 
obtain here. That respondent is a nonprofit organization may 
provide some basis for distinguishing it from business enter-
~~  prises, since the uses to which commercial property:_~~~.~~_:-;· 
often be valued in terms of the capitalized earnings produced. 
See 506 F. 2d, at 799; 1 L. Orgel, supra, ~ 157. Cf. United 
States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 
U. S., at 403. But there is no reason to treat respondent 
differently from the many private homeowners and other non-
commercial property-owners who neither derive earnings from 
their property nor hold it for investment purposes. Unless 
the Just Compensation Clause mandates a Government sub-
sidy for nonprofit organizations, a proposition we find patently 
implausible, respondent's nonprofit status does not require us 
to reject application of the fair market value standard. 
77-488-0PINION 
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Nor is it relevant in this case whether respondent's camps 
were reasonably necessary to the public welfare. In con-
demnations of property owned by public entities, lower courts 
have applied the reasonable necessity standard to determine if 
the entity has an obligation to continue providing the facili-
ties taken. See, e. g. , 506 F. 2d, at 800; United States v. 
Streets, Alleys& Public Ways, 531 F. 2d 882, 886 (CA81976); 
United States v. Certain Property, 403 F. 2d 800 (CA2 1968). 
This duty may be legally compel1ed or arise from necessity; 
"the distinction has little practical significance in public con-
demnation." 403 F. 2d, at 803 (citation omitted). If the 
condemnee has such a duty to replace the property, these 
courts have reasoned that only an award of the costs of devel-
oping requisite substitute facilities will compensate for the 
loss. 
Whatever the merits of this reasoning with respect to publie 
entities, see n. 3, supra, it does not advance analysis here. For 
respondent is under no legal or factual obligation to replace 
the camps, regardless of their social worth. As a private 
entity, respondent is free to direct its resources to serve its 
own institutional objectives, which may or may not correspond 
with community needs. Awa.rding replacement cost on the 
theory that respondent would continue to operate the camps 
for a public purpose would thus provide a windfall if substi-
tute facilities were never acquired, or if acquired, were later 
sold or converted to another use. 
Finally, that the camps may have benefited the community 
does not warrant compensating respondent differently from 
other private owners. The community benefit which the 
camps conferred might provide an indication of the public's 
loss upon condemnation of the property. But we cannot 
accept the Court of Appeals' conclusion that this loss is rele-
vant to assessing the compensation due a private entity. The 
court noted that "[o]ne rationale for the substitute facilities 
measure is to indemnify not only the owner of the condemned 
facilities, but those who have an interest in the continuing 
77-488-0PINION 
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existence of the facilities. in this case, according to the Synod, 
the general public." 576 F. 2d. at 989 n. 4. The guiding 
principle of just compensation, however, is that the owner of 
the condemned property "must be made whole but is not 
entitled to more." Olson v. United States, 292 U. S., at 255. 
Respondent did not hold its property as the public's trustee 
and thus is not entitled to be indemnified for the public's 
loss. Moreover, many condemnees use their property in a 
manner that confers a benefit on the community, and there i!!! 
no sound basis for considering this factor only in condemna~ 
tions of property owned by nonprofit organizations. And to 
make the measure of compensation depend on a jury's subjec~ 
tive estimation of whether a particular use "benefits" the 
community would conflict with this Court's efforts to develop 
practical valuation standards. 
In sum, we find no circumstances here that require suspen~ 
sion of the normal rules for determining just compensation. 
Respondent, like other private owners, is not entitled to re-
cover for nontransferable values arising from its unique need 
for the property. To the extent denial of such an award 
departs from the indemnity principle, it is justified by the 
necessity for a workable measure of valuation. Allowing. 
respondent the fair market value of its property is thus con~ 
sistent with the "basic equitable principles of fainwss," United 
States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488,490 (1973), underlying the Just 
Compensation Clause. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed~ 
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JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN May 3, 1979 
Re: No. 78-488 - United States v. 564.64 Acres of Land 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
H. A.B. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
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RE: No. 78-488 United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land 
Dear Thurgood: 
I agree . 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
May 3 , 1979 
78- 488 U. S . v . 564 . 54 Acres 
Dear Thurgooo: 
Please show on the next draft of your opinion that 
I took no part in the consi~Pration o~ decision of this case . 
Mr. J ustice Marshall 
l fP / SS 
c c: The Confer~nce 
·, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
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May 4, 1979 
Re: No. 78-488 - United States v. 564.54 Acres - of Land 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely'./ 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
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Respectfully, 
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Mr. Justice Marshall 
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Mr. Justice Marshall 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES v 
No. 78-488 
United States, Petitioner, 
v. 
564.54 Acres of Land, More or Less, 
situated in Monroe and Pike 
Counties, Pennsylvania, 
et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit. 
[May -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE, concurring in the opmwn and the 
judgment. 
The Court rejects the claim that the measure of compensa-
tion in this case is the cost of substitute facilities rather than 
the fair market value of the taken property, here a camp 
owned by a private, nonprofit corporation. I am in full 
agreement. The substitute facilities doctrine is unrelated to 
fair market value and does not depend on whether fair market 
value is readily ascertainable; rather, it unabashedly demands 
additional compensation over and above market value in order 
to allow the replacement of the condemned facility.1 In those 
cases where it has been applied, primarily where public facili-
ties have been condemned, the basic premise is that the con-
demnee is under some obligation to continue the functions 
performed on the taken property.2 But I do not understand 
1 See 576 F. 2d 983, 991 (CA3 1977), quoted ante n. 4; United States v. 
Streets, Alleys & Public Ways, 5;31 F. 2d 882 (CA8 1976); United States v. 
Certain Property in Borough of Manhattan, 403 F. 2d 800 (CA2 1968); 
United States v. Certain Land in Borough of Brooklyn, 346 F. 2d 690 
(CA2 1965); United States v. Board of Education, 253 F. 2d 690 (CA4 
195 ) ; National Conferrncc of Commis~ioners on Uniform State Laws, 
Uniform Eminent Domain Code,§ 1004 (b). 
2 See, e. g., United States v. Certain Land in Borough of Brooklyn, supra. 
at 694; 576 F. 2d, at 992-995. 
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how a duty to replace the condemned facility justifies paying 
more than market value. Obviously, replacing the old with a 
new facility will cost more than the value of the old, but the 
new facility will its<'lf be more valuable and last longer." This 
is true with respect to condemnation of any facility, whether 
or not there is an obligation to reproduce it, and I had not 
understood -i;hat --the just compensation clause to guarantee 
subsidies to either private or public projects. Similarly, if 
more demanding building codes or other regulations will 
enhance the cost of replacement. it is reasonable to assume 
that compliance itself will be of some benefit to the owHer 
and hence need not be financed by the condenmor. 
It may be that a condemnee's obliga.tion to continue the 
function performed on the condemned property aud hence to 
replace the facility taken will result in loss of value in that 
the condemnee does not have the option of investing his fair~ 
market~value award in a project that will provide the con-
demnee with greater net benefits than would replacement of 
the taken facility. But the existing law imposing the obliga~ 
tion presumably embodies the policy ,judgment that alterna~ 
tive projects, from which the condemnee might or might not 
derive more benefits. should not be made available to the 
condemnee. Even if some incremental loss due to legal con-
straints on the obligated condemnee's options is thus imposed, 
it is sheer speculation to assume that this loss will be equal 
to the full increase in cost of the facility to be reproduced or 
replaced. It seems to me that the argument for enhaHced 
compensation to the obligated condemnee is nothing more 
3 The ;;ub:;titute faeiliti(•:< measme applied by the Court of Appeals in 
thi;; raRe appear:; to contemplate pa~·ment of rPproduction costs, not rr-
plaeemrnt eol't;;, sre 576 F. 2d, at 999, and n . 2 (Stern, J. , concurring;); 
50G F. 2d 796, 799-ROO (CA:11976) (Arres 1). M. noted in United States 
v. Certain Prope1·ty i11 Borough of Manhattan. supra, at 804, court::; appl~r­
ing the ~ub;,;titutr facilities measurr have taken diffrrrnt po~itiou;,; regard-
ing whether depreciation should be deducted from the cost of :1 uew 
facility. 
'78-488-CONCUR 
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than a particularized submission that the award should exceed 
fair market value because of the unique uses to which the 
property has been put by the condemnee or because of the 
unique value the property has for it. 
I thus agree with the Court that the just compensation 
clause does not require payment of the cost of a substitute 
facility where the condemnee is a private organization, even 
if it could be said that such an owner is in some sense obli-
gated to replace the property " or that the public has a stake 
in the continuance of the function that is being carried on the 
taken property." I also have substantial doubt that the clause 
should be auy difl'erently construed and applied where public 
property is comlemned, whether or not the function conducted 
on the property must be continued at another location. That 
issue, however, is not before the Court and is expressly put 
aside for another clay. 
1 The Comt ~<tatrs that respondent. "is under no legal or factual obliga-
tion to replare the camps .... " Although respondent. which is subject to 
the Pennsylvania Non-Profit Corporation Law of 1972, Pa. C. S. § 7549 
(1975), apparently is not legally obliged to replace its camps, othrr private, 
nonprofit entrrprise~< ma~· b<' under a legal obligation-imposed by their 
own articles of incorporation, h~· the terms under which gifts ar<' mad<' to 
tlwm, or direct!~· b~· >:tat<' law-to rontinue financing of certain facilities 
or funrtion;; . Indred, private organizations opernted for profit ma~· be 
undN contractual or othrr legal obligation to replace a condemned 
facility. 
5 For \)111'JlOSes of drciding whethPr an obligation to replarr requires a 
condrmnation award greatrr than mark<'t value, it is seemingly irrelevant 
·to whom tlw brndit,.: of ownrr ·hip may be said to accrue, be thi::; the 
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